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Abstract 
 
This paper considers the behavior patterns of Russian firms before and during the 
financial crisis of 2008-2009. To facilitate comparison, we define three main 
groups of actors at the firm level in the Russian economy – large, politically 
connected companies; mid-size firms that expanded in the 2000s with the help of 
administrative support, and successful mid-size firms driven by market factors. 
Many of the large companies practiced highly risky financial policy and 
experienced a decrease in efficiency before the crisis, and the managers and 
owners of some Russian firms have been engaging in opportunistic behavior 
during the crisis; the forms and causes of this behavior are analyzed here. We 
conclude by proposing some policy implications with emphasis on supporting 
successful mid-size firms driven by market factors. 
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Despite official attempts to designate Russia as a safe-haven in the stormy sea of the 
global financial crisis, the crisis has deeply affected the Russian economy. Until mid-2008, 
Russia’s economic growth rates remained high, following the trend of the preceding nine years 
(the average annual GDP growth rate between 1999 and 2007 was 7%; in 2007 the rate was 
8.1%). The crisis first manifested itself in August 2008, when stock indexes fell sharply, 
culminating in a market crash in September. As a result, the leading RTS stock market indicator 
plunged four times (from almost 2,500 points in the beginning of May to less than 600 points in 
late October 2008, however in June 2009 it was about 1,000 points). This steep decline posed 
problems for the financial sector because banks extensively borrowed foreign money on share 
packages. A number of big banks teetered on the brink of bankruptcy, and a panic erupted 
among their depositors.  
Nevertheless, prompt assistance from the government and the Central Bank helped 
stabilize the situation in the financial sector by November, despite increasing inflationary 
pressure on the rouble. As a result, by the end of autumn 2008, the probable economic slowdown 
and the need to settle the external debts of Russian corporations, along with rising inflation, were 
believed to be the major challenges for the Russian economy. Meanwhile, economic growth 
forecasts for 2009 were generally positive. For instance, Sergei Aleksashenko, a well-known 
Russian expert and former Deputy Governor of the Bank of Russia, believed in November that 
GDP growth in 2009 would be no higher than 2.5% (Aleksashenko, 2008, p.34); the World Bank 
estimated GDP growth at 3% based on unchanged oil prices of around 75 US dollars a barrel 
(World Bank, 2008, p. 17), and the November outlook issued by the European Commission for 
Russia predicted even growth rates of 6% in 2009 and 6.5% in 2010 (DG ECFIN, 2008, p. 137).  
However, in reality, the ramifications of the crisis were much more severe. As stated in 
the Russia Economic Report released by the World Bank in June 2009, the overall decline in 
global demand, falling commodity prices, and the tightening of credit have accelerated Russia’s 
economic slowdown since the fourth quarter of 2008 ( Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Main indicators of Russian economic development, 2006-9 
  2006   2007   2008  Q4 
2008  
Q1 
2009  
GDP growth, %   7.7   8.1   5.6   1.1   -9.8 
Industrial production growth, year on year, %   6.3   6.3   2.1   -6.1   -14.3 
Fixed capital investment growth, %, year on  16.7   21.1   9.8   -2.3   -15.6   3
year  
Federal government balance, % GDP   7.4   5.5   4.0   4.0   -0.6 
Inflation (CPI), % change, end of period   9.0   11.9   13.3   13.3   5.4 
Current account, in billions of dollars   95.6   76.6   98.9   8.1   11.1 
Unemployment, % (ILO definition)   7.2   6.1   6.3   7.1   9.4 
Memo: Oil prices, Urals ($/barrel)   61.2   69.5   95.1   54.9   44.1 
Reserves (including gold), in billions of dollars, 
end of period  
303.7   478.8   427.1   427.1   383.9 
Source:    (World Bank, 2009a, 2009b) on the databases of Rosstat, CBR, Ministry of 
Finance, Bloomberg data. 
 
The economy deteriorated dramatically in early 2009. The estimated contraction in real 
GDP in the first quarter of 2009 was 9.8 percent, down from 8.7 percent growth during the same 
period in 2008. Based on the most recent April-May data in the second quarter, real GDP is 
estimated to contract even further, driven by continued decline in industrial production.  
All major sectors reported a contraction in the first quarter of 2009 as a result of weak 
demand, low investment levels and collapsed industrial output. Adjustments in tradables are 
especially large due to deteriorating external environment and consumer confidence. 
Contractions in the tradable sector, estimated at 14.4 percent in the first quarter of 2009, were 
driven by a sharp fall in industrial production, 14.3 percent, especially in transport equipment 
and other sectors in manufacturing. Non-tradables continued to defy the trend of tradables by 
registering growth in the last quarter of 2008 but contracted 6.2 percent in the first quarter of 
2009. Driven largely by demand- and finance-sensitive retail and construction sectors, these 
contractions reflect an impact of economic shocks that are gradually filtering through labor and 
financial markets by higher unemployment, lower household incomes and tighter credit 
conditions. Construction sector, for example, reported a 20.9 percent decline in Q1-2009 relative 
to 2008, while transport contracted by 7.4 percent and retail trade by 4.9 percent in the first 
quarter of 2009. 
According to World Bank estimates aggregate unemployment in Russia could reach 13 
percent in 2009. This estimate reflects both a contraction in employment as well as changes in 
the sectoral structure of employment. The sectors most affected will likely be manufacturing, 
construction and retail trade. “Monocities” with large spatial concentration of these sectors are 
being particularly hard hit.   4
In mid-March 2009 the government started to use the Reserve Fund to cover its fiscal gap 
as it was planned in the amended 2009 Budget. In the March-May 2009 period, the Reserve 
Fund has lost $35.4 billion and currently stands at $101 billion. The share already spent by the 
government constitutes 3 percent of GDP out of 7 percent planned for 2009. 
As a result, according to World Bank estimations, due to the much bleaker global 
financial outlook and oil prices in the 45 US dollars per barrel range, the Russian economy is 
likely to contract by 7.9% in 2009 (World Bank, 2009b, p. 12). Recent forecast of the Ministry 
of Economic Development of the Russian Federation predicts that GDP will decline by 8% in 
2009.  
Judging by visible trends, Russia is merely on the threshold of the crisis; the worst is still 
to come. In any case, the time has come to think about the outcome of this crisis and about the 
range of factors that could help to curtail it.   
One of such factors is prudent macroeconomic policy that will lower the incentives for 
economic agents to engage in opportunistic behavior and rent-seeking. At the same time, 
companies also have to make efforts to overcome the crisis. The firms that continue to 
modernize their production processes and businesses to boost productivity will define the post-
crisis trajectory of the Russian economy. In the realm of industrial policy, the government’s duty 
is not to bail everyone out but to provide incentives and opportunities for these kinds of firms. . 
In order to formulate an effective, coherent anti-crisis industrial policy that contains a vision for 
the future, it is essential to understand the models of behavior guiding present-day Russian firms, 
how these models have been distorted by the crisis, and how they are expected to evolve. We 
will try to address these issues in this paper. 
1.  The pre-crisis situation or the Russian corporate sector in the early and mid-
2000s. 
Recent studies (Puffer & McCarthy, 2003; Yakovlev, 2004; Andreff, 2005; Yakovlev & 
Danilov, 2007) suggest that although the quality of corporate governance in Russia was 
improving in the 2000s (in terms of formal indicators), certain features of Russian corporations 
were preserved, such as their: 
•  Highly concentrated ownership and control; 
•  Rapid pace of corporate integration (with integrated business groups dominating the     
      Russian economy); 
•  Tendency to ‘personify’ Russian business.   5
The more detailed studies (Dolgopyatova et al., 2009) have also furnished evidence of the 
emergence of new tendencies in the Russian corporate sector. One of these tendencies is the 
separation of ownership and management. This tendency has manifested itself most explicitly in 
holding company groups (business groups), which often include several scores of independent 
juridical persons. Because the final owners are incapable of managing the entire complex of 
assets in their possession, they are hiring managers to run their enterprises instead.  
Another tendency is the increase in the real usage of instruments of modern corporate 
governance. In the first half of the 2000s, measures such as establishing greater transparency, 
hiring outside directors, paying regular dividends, and launching domestic and international IPOs 
were largely cosmetic; they were primarily taken to improve the corporate reputation of Russian 
companies in global markets rather than to effect real decision-making. However, a survey of 
822 joint-stock companies conducted in the framework of a joint Russian-Japanese project in 
2005 (Dolgopyatova et al., 2009) demonstrated that the firms had not introduced these best 
practices of corporate governance merely to boost their image or appease minority shareholders 
(whose role was nonetheless still weak). Russian companies are instead increasingly using the 
instruments of corporate governance to resolve the agency problem between owners and 
managers. They are focusing on internal instruments, such as granting a bigger role to boards of 
directors, introducing incentives for managers based on company returns, etc. The substantial 
renewal of management teams in large and mid-size enterprises and the establishment of a link 
between personnel changes and company returns are some of the positive effects of this trend. 
The above-mentioned tendencies are typical mostly of ordinary member companies of 
business groups. This is how Russian business groups, which were created largely to defend the 
property rights and interests of company owners in the imperfect institutional environment, have 
become advocates of best practices of corporate governance in recent years. 
In general, recent studies present a picture of a gradually changing Russian corporate 
model. In the 1990s, “the transitional firm” became a standard fixture on the Russian business 
scene. Run by managers who were independent of shareholders, this entity was characterized by 
a very opaque ownership structure, crude violations of shareholder rights, hostility to outside 
investors, and blatant disregard for the standards and mechanisms of corporate governance (Blasi 
et al., 1997; Kraakman, Black & Tarassova, 2000). This peculiar corporate model is now 
becoming a thing of the past. As a result, although some elements of national corporate identity 
have remained intact, in the mid-2000s Russian joint-stock companies began edging toward the 
classical path of development in market-oriented economies. We can therefore speak about two 
different models, one for large-scale businesses and another for mid-size companies, each   6
playing an objectively different role in the economy. In the next section, we will discuss their 
criteria for distinction. 
The perspective model for mid-size Russian companies can be defined as a closely held 
firm (as described by Berglöf & von Thadden, 2000) with a bias towards concentrated 
ownership, a limited presence on securities markets and distance from the state. On the contrary, 
due to the national features of public policy in Russia, the largest companies can be expected to 
model themselves after development firms, which rely on informal ties with investors and the 
government; this model is commonly found in South-East Asia. 
2.  What are large and mid-size businesses? 
We would like to point out that there are different definitions of large and mid-size 
companies in the Russian academic and business environments. For instance, in the latest 
“Expert-400” rating computed in autumn 2008 from 2007 data (Expert magazine, 2008), the 
bottom rungs were occupied by companies with annual sales volumes of around $400 million. 
However, Yakov Pappe, the leading Russian expert on the problems of big business, believes 
that large companies in Russia nowadays are those with annual sales volumes of $1 billion in the 
oil and gas industry and $500 million in the remaining industries (Pappe & Galukhina, 2009, p. 
22).  
In the paper  (Yakovlev & Danilov, 2007), we classified companies with an annual 
turnover of more than $1 billion as “large”. According to this criterion, as of 2007, 151 firms 
qualified as large-scale companies (based on the “Expert-400” rating). However, very few large-
scale companies are public in real rather than juridical terms. Of the 151 large-scale companies, 
only 39 have a formal marker for their stock (enabling their market capitalization to be 
calculated). For this reason, using the single criterion of capitalization to estimate business scales 
in Russia is not fully accurate.   
Estimating the share of large-scale corporations in the Russian economy is a task 
requiring many complex calculations. The existing data allow only a relatively accurate 
comparison between the pre-tax returns (losses subtracted) of the largest corporations, which can 
be calculated from the data presented by Expert magazine, and the profit and loss balances of 
large and mid-size enterprises, which can be computed from Rosstat data. This comparison gives 
the share of the largest corporations in the Russia economy (with sales exceeding $1 billion) in 
2007 as 49.5%. 
Determining the characteristics of mid-size businesses in Russia is also a difficult task. 
For instance, according to the Federal Law No.209-FZ “On the Development of Small and Mid-  7
size Enterprises in Russia” (Section 4, point 1), mid-size enterprises include those with 100 to 
250 employees. However, the relevant federal government guideline has set a limit of 100-400 
million rubles in annual sales for mid-size enterprises (or no more than $16-17 million for 2008). 
Contrary to this approach  in its special “Mid-size Business” project (Vin’kov et al., 2008), 
Expert magazine included in this category companies with an annual turnover of more than $10 
million, with the exception of the enterprises listed in the “Expert-400” rating. In 2006, the 
number of such companies in Russia’s private sector was about 13,000, and their weight in total 
earnings relative to all Russian companies with a turnover of more than $10 million was 44%.  
We define large-scale companies as those with an annual turnover of over $1 billion and 
mid-size companies (by international standards) as those with a turnover ranging from $50 
million to $1 billion. According to this definition in 2006, there were more than 3,000 mid-size 
companies in Russia. 
3.  Patterns of firm behavior in the pre-crisis period (2006-2008). 
We have observed the following tendencies to be typical of the entire corporate sector in 
Russia over the last three years: 
•  Expansion of the public sector with an increasing volume and variety of assets in state-owned 
companies, including the establishment of new joint-stock companies with government 
stakes (industrial holding companies based on the restructuring of state-owned assets, 
development institutions, and capitalization with the use of public funds); 
•  Expansion of public demand by means of government procurement of goods; public support 
for large-scale investment projects with the funds of The Investment Foundation of the 
Russian Federation and the state corporation “Bank for Development and Foreign Economic 
Affairs (VneshEconomBank)”; organization of large-scale programs to develop infrastructure 
(e.g. the 2014 Winter Olympic games in Sochi, the 2012 APEC summit in Vladivostok); and 
the implementation of the National Housing Project. As a result, some corporations are 
seeking public resources and trying to acquire special foreign assets to achieve their goals;    
•  Increasing pressure of competition from global markets and a tendency to speed up mergers 
and acquisitions (“buy or you will be bought”); 
•  More foreign borrowing, heavier debt burden;   
•  Imposition of tough restrictions on foreign investors and shareholders (The Law on 
Investment in Strategic Enterprises; a conflict between the Russian government and the 
British Petroleum Co.).   8
At the same time, a number of these tendencies were limited to certain groups of 
companies in the corporate sector. For instance, large enterprises expanded their scale, 
complicated their organizational structures, decreased their internal efficiency, and undermined 
their owners’ ability to exercise control over them. However, this tendency was typical of all 
large-scale corporations entering into global financial markets and seeking to establish a strong 
foothold. At the same time, some tendencies specific to Russia also took shape:  
•  Informal relationships with the government became closer (especially after the YUKOS 
affair). Practically no large enterprise could survive in the Russian market at that time unless 
it had the endorsement of the state (Puffer & McCarthy, 2007). 
•  For many companies, relationships with the government paved the way for receiving 
“administrative rents”, which in the short run were much higher than anything achievable by 
reliance on business streamlining and improvement of internal efficiency. 
•  At the same time, this proximity to the state produced an illusion of lower risks and created 
an incentive for active borrowing (mostly abroad, because the Russian financial system was 
underdeveloped) as well as for super-aggressive buy-ups of assets.  
The remaining uncertainty about ownership rights could also be a factor behind the 
growing indebtedness of the corporate sector. For instance, according to Alexander Shokhin, the 
President of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP), despite high returns 
on domestic investment (which in 2006-2007 triggered substantial growth in foreign investment 
in Russia), many owners of private Russian companies preferred to funnel their profits into 
foreign off-shore accounts and invest in decidedly less rewarding projects. At the same time, 
their companies in Russia were financed by borrowing. For this reason, companies were 
burdened with excessive debts, and in the event of takeovers, the would-be acquirers had to 
assume liability for these debts. 
It is therefore evident that the internal inefficiency of the largest Russian companies 
continued to deteriorate. The decline went undetected by external investors – and apparently by 
owners and top managers of these companies – due to the smokescreen created by high rates of 
economic growth and readily obtainable money. 
However, mid-size businesses have been coming to the fore in recent years, neck and 
neck with their larger counterparts. Contrary to the conventional wisdom of the expert 
community, these companies grew quickly in the 2000s and were solely responsible for pushing 
the real diversification of the Russian economy forward (Vin’kov et al., 2008; Sementsov et al., 
2008). As shown in a study conducted by Expert magazine, these companies were very diverse   9
in terms of their rates of development. In 2000-2006, about a quarter of these mid-size firms 
(defined by Expert magazine as earning more than 10 million dollars in sales) experienced a 
decline in real turnover at constant prices in spite of rapid overall economic growth in the 
country; on the other hand, 38.5% of these firms displayed an increase in turnover at annual rates 
of 20% and more (three times higher than the average GDP growth rates in that period). 
These data conform to the results of the project on the competitiveness of the Russian 
economy conducted by the SU-HSE and the World Bank in 2005-2007. This study showed that 
Russian companies are characterized by a considerable diversity in productivity levels, with 
dispersion within each sector being considerably larger than among sectors (Golikova et al., 
2007). In the group of the most competitive and effective firms, which make up to 20-25% of the 
total number, productivity is at least three times higher than the sectoral average. At the same 
time, a large percentage (30-40%) of all firms exhibits extremely low productivity. There are 
clusters of inefficient firms in every sector, even in the most competitive ones. The intersectoral 
dispersion between the best 20% and the worst 20% of Russian firms is as high as 20-25 times. 
These results prove that there are high entry and exit barriers, which have served to prolong the 
life of the ineffective, non-market sector of manufacturing. 
Consequently, it is safe to say that before the current crisis, differences between Russian 
companies were usually very high. While  some firms were highly efficient, in line with 
international standards of competitiveness, the others were  utterly inefficient and should have 
died, but nevertheless managed to survive. 
Meanwhile, a segment of successful medium-size firms has emerged in the economy, 
with greater mobility and internal efficiency than the companies belonging to the first echelon. 
Mid-size companies have generally had difficulty obtaining access to external financial 
resources, meaning that they have had lower indicators of debt-to-sales than large corporations. 
In recent years, mid-size companies have been actively trading on stock markets, especially on 
the Russian market (Box 1).  
Box 1. The role of the stock market as the source of investment for large and mid-
size Russian companies in 2007-2008  
In 2007, nineteen corporations conducted IPOs and entered the securities market; 
another ten conducted secondary offerings at the market; and another five corporations with 
Russian assets conducted public offerings at foreign stock exchanges. In 2008, another seven 
corporations conducted IPOs; ten corporations conducted SPOs; and two foreign companies 
with Russian assets publicly floated their shares (Danilov & Yakushin, 2008).  This large   10
inflow of corporations to the equity market enables us to present a fairly representative 
evaluation of this market in terms of percentage distribution of large and mid-size corporations 
(see table below). 
Number of IPOs in 2007-2008 
Corporations Large  Mid-size  Not included in the “Expert-
400” (non-classifiable) 
All 
 corporations 
Conducted IPOs  7 6  13  26 
Conducted secondary public 
offerings of shares 
7 7  6  20 
Foreign corporations with 
Russian assets 
3 0  4  7 
Total 17  13  23  53 
The above data suggest that although the stock market is more accessible to the largest 
corporations, a substantial number of mid-size Russian corporations are heavily relying on it 
as a source to fund their dynamic growth.  
In our opinion, successful mid-size firms have a higher degree of internal efficiency than 
the firms in the first echelon because their businesses can be more easily observed by their 
owners. The mid-size firms are also less likely to rely on connections with the public 
administration; furthermore, they work in a more competitive environment and are more inclined 
to make innovations. Successful mid-size Russian firms, in comparison with their foreign 
counterparts, can quickly adapt to unfavorable external conditions, including “severe” business 
climates.
4 
At the same time, as shown by a more detailed examination of the most successful 217 
mid-size companies in Expert magazine’s project, these companies’ ultra-high rates of growth 
were often due to their success in finding specific market niches with practically unlimited 
demand.  
Generally speaking, on the eve of the current crisis, big businesses suffered from a 
relative decline in efficiency, which remained unnoticed by outside investors and unrecognized 
by their owners and top managers. At the same time, a segment of fast-growing companies came 
into being in Russia, accounting for 20-25% of the total number of mid-size businesses. Their 
                                                 
4  In this context, we would like to quote Lev Freinkman, who, in his description of Russian forms at a workshop in 
the SU-HSE, said that in contrast to its foreign counterparts, the successful Russian mid-size business lives in highly 
imperfect institutional environment and acts according to a regime of “subversive guerilla detachment”. In other 
words, this type of firm is extremely durable yet able to dissolve and vanish if necessary.   11
steady growth over seven years is evidence of their efficiency. However, mid-size companies 
with low and medium degrees of efficiency remained in the second echelon too.  
These three segments – large companies, efficient mid-size firms and the rest of the mid-
size firms – behaved quite differently in the crisis situation. This is the focus of our analysis in 
the next section.  
4.  Reaction to the crisis 
At the outset of this section, we have to issue a certain methodological caveat. As we 
mentioned above, the Russian economy is only just starting to enter the crisis, which we believe 
will last a fairly long time. At this point, no one – including ourselves, other experts, and the 
government – has complex systematic information about the state and behavior of the enterprises 
at hand. Therefore, the “typical models” we have created here should be interpreted as 
hypotheses based on available cases and facts as well as on a certain logic; they will certainly 
require further empirical testing. Nevertheless, we believe that even in this hypothetical form, 
our models could serve as useful tools for analyzing what is going on in the real sector of the 
Russian economy as well as for designing more adequate instruments of economic policy. 
We must also emphasize that models of firm behavior can be strongly influenced by the 
general situation in relevant sectoral markets. In cases of plunging demand, even efficient mid-
size companies can fail, but if demand declines smoothly or remains stable, large and inefficient 
firms might opt to implement less opportunistic strategies. 
With respect to the reaction of Russian enterprises to the crisis, we presume that on the 
way out, the decisive factor will be the behavior of the largest and fastest-growing (efficient) 
mid-size companies. The composition of efficient mid-size firms could change over the course of 
the crisis and in the post-crisis period, because the mid-size companies that focused heavily on 
the expansion of public demand will probably fall apart and new efficient mid-size companies 
will enter the market. (For instance, these new players might evolve from companies that 
manage to fulfill investment projects with imported equipment and orientation towards domestic 
consumer demand, which is expanding now via the replacement of imports due to the ruble 
devaluation.) At the same time, we must distinguish between two mid-size sub-groups that 
developed steadily and swiftly in the pre-crisis period. The first group includes the companies 
that have experienced rapid growth due to finding new market niches, realizing new business 
ideas, and introducing new technologies and products. The second group encompasses the firms 
whose success has been based on their decision to resort to so-called “administrative resources”. 
As we understand it, “administrative resources” consist of informal support from public   12
authorities, a practice that limits competition and gives preferential treatment to certain 
companies (the construction industry has frequently made use of these “resources”). 
In reality, these two sub-groups can be hard to distinguish. In the 2000s, for example, 
many successful mid-size companies tried to simultaneously rely on market forces and seek out 
“administrative resources”. Nevertheless, we believe that the distinction is useful for analytical 
purposes. To illustrate this point, we will provide a stylized description of how three groups of 
firms – the largest companies, successful mid-size enterprises that have relied mostly on market 
factors, and successful mid-size enterprises that have mostly depended on “administrative 
resources” – are reacting to the crisis.  
 The largest companies: 
•  Have been hampered by excessively aggressive policies and the systematic underestimation 
of risks;  
•  Possess a more complicated management structure; they have the status of public companies. 
The owners do not have adequate information about the condition of their businesses, and it 
is difficult to prevent managers from engaging in opportunistic behavior. However, the main 
owners cannot take advantage of every possible measure for improving efficiency because 
they are obliged to disclose and explain all major actions to their shareholders and investors; 
•  Have close proximity to the state. This enables them to lobby for assistance, but upon receipt 
of this aid, they tend to become saddled with additional “social obligations” (support of 
employment), which impede their efforts to restructure and improve efficiency; 
•  Can take out public loans against shares. These loans are unlikely to be repaid, however, and 
pledges for them become the property of the state. But because the state has not yet 
announced its plans or intentions in such cases, this situation is going to produce further 
uncertainty about ownership rights. The relevant risks objectively give managers and current 
owners incentives to engage in opportunistic behavior and withdraw assets, which obviously 
does nothing whatsoever to promote restructuring;  
•  Can block the allocation of public support to more efficient companies in the “second 
echelon” by virtue of their close proximity to the state and common interests; 
•  Are more likely to lobby for public support. This is because government leaders, on the basis 
of contacts with representatives of large companies and in the absence of other reliable 
sources of information, tend to form a distorted picture of current events that is biased   13
towards negative trends, which gives big businesses additional impetus to lobby for public 
support. 
Mid-size companies whose growth largely depends on market factors: 
•  Can obtain significant incentives to increase exports; 
•  Can demonstrate dynamic growth based on import substitution on the condition of having 
completed their investment projects; 
•  Will have limited access to foreign technologies and components due to the sharp 
devaluation of the ruble and thus have serious difficulty completing their innovation projects; 
•  Will collide with one another when competing for resources for expansion and development, 
with companies relying mostly on support from the public administration; 
•  Will be ready for severe restructuring under severe crisis conditions; 
•  Will speed up the implementation of projects to improve their efficiency, thus reducing their 
“time horizons” dramatically; 
•  Will try to keep a low profile vis-à-vis the expansion of their activities in order to avoid the 
imposition of additional “social obligations” and pressure to deal with inefficient partners. 
Mid-size companies whose growth largely depends on administrative support: 
•  Will face a dramatic drop in competitive power; 
•  Might resort to opportunistic strategies in the face of drastic layoffs, hoping to provoke 
“social tension” on the side of authorities and create conditions for lobbying for public 
support; 
•  Will rely more actively on their connections with government, using up the resources that are 
intended to support entrepreneurial activity (e.g. funds for ensuring access for small and mid-
size enterprises to federal and municipal procurement systems), and limiting the scope of 
competition;  
•  Will be able to rely on the regional and local authorities with whom they cooperate. 
Although companies in the different groups behave in different ways, we expect the 
Russian market to undergo a substantial redistribution of property rights. The redistribution will 
primarily take place in the sectors that are most severely affected by the crisis (machinery, 
metals, chemicals, construction), as well as in the sectors that had stronger competition and 
lower profit rates before the crisis (retail trade, agriculture). This redistribution might also be   14
driven by the largest companies having to sell off some of their assets – among other reasons, to 
repay their debts to lenders.
5  
However, we believe that the redistribution will hardly change the structure of ownership 
in Russian companies: it will most likely remain highly concentrated. In this respect, the 
methods for settlement of defaults on corporate bonds are fairly informative (Box 2). 
Box 2. Behavior of mid-size companies in case of default on the corporate bond market  
Defaults on corporate bonds have become much more frequent.  
There were 109 technical defaults during October 2008-March 2009. In the event of 
technical default of payment, issuer companies can choose one of the following strategies: 
•  They can mobilize all possibilities to avoid a full-fledged default. In this case, as a 
rule, a corporation can use the days remaining in the loan period to try to cover its 
liabilities in order to prevent its technical default from turning into a full-fledged one. 
Otherwise, the corporation can immediately open talks about restructuring to keep its 
creditors from suing for bankruptcy after a full-fledged default. This occurred in 21% 
of the technical defaults registered in the period of October 2008 to March 2009.  
•  They can try to avoid bankruptcy after the default has been declared. They can either 
attempt to restructure their liabilities in talks with the holders or to swap their debt for 
property (i.e. convert bonds into equities). This happened in 3% of the technical 
defaults registered in the period of October 2008 to March 2009.  
•  They can either do nothing or precede their bankruptcy with asset withdrawal in an 
attempt to swindle their creditors. This approach results in a full-fledged default 
followed by bankruptcy. Companies took this route in 76% of the technical defaults 
registered in the period of October 2008 to March 2009. 
It should be noted that these figures became much worse in the first months of 2009 (as 
of the end of October, November, and December, these indicators were 31%, 22%, and 47%, 
respectively). We believe that the government’s bailout policy was the main catalyst of the 
Russian corporations’ skyrocketing defaults. Once the firms realized that the government would 
come to the rescue, they toned down their efforts to avoid bankruptcy by themselves. For this 
reason, the general rate of technical defaults went up from 5% in October 2008 to 16% in 
February 2009, but then down to 10% in March 2009. 
                                                 
5 According to (Aleksashenko, 2008), by the fall of 2008, the external debts of the Russian corporate sector were 
about $500 billion, of which $200 billion were slated to mature before the end of 2009.   15
It is worth noting that Russian corporations have never looked to the stock market for salvation 
from bankruptcy (the practice of conducting IPOs in order to dodge bankruptcy is widespread in 
international markets). Russian corporations instead tend to change their majority owner rather 
than appeal to the general public for aid. 
 
5.  Preliminary conclusion and policy implications 
We believe that successful mid-size companies that relied mostly on market factors in 
their development during the 2000s could become the driving force for enhanced corporate 
efficiency and might lift the Russian economy out of the crisis. Of course, we cannot give a 
precise forecast of their future role. Nevertheless, relying on the data obtained from the project 
conducted by the SU-HSE and the World Bank as well as from Expert magazine’s project on 
mid-size enterprises, we can suppose that before the outbreak of the crisis, the share of efficient, 
fast-growing enterprises ranged from a quarter to a third of the total number of mid-size firms. 
Their share was still higher in terms of total sales than that of small and mid-size enterprises 
However, until recently, this type of enterprise was essentially ignored by federal 
policymakers; the main target of support during the initial phase of the financial crisis was the 
largest companies. For example, at the end of December 2008, the government approved a list of 
295 “system-creating” enterprises
6 and declared that these firms could expect to receive 
government credit guarantees, subsidies for interest rates, restructured tax debts, public 
procurements, and preferential export and import tariffs. The criteria for inclusion in this list 
were annual sales of over 15 billion rubles or half billion dollars and a workforce of no less than 
4,000 employees; in addition, firms on the list were required to have the status of enterprises 
forming company towns and a certain amount of tax payments. 
We believe that the government’s policy of favoring the largest firms is risky because 
these companies are generally inefficient and their owners and managers lack sufficient 
incentives for restructuring. Their reluctance to restructure is partly due to the heavy reliance on 
customs instruments for protecting domestic producers; this protection limits domestic 
competition and hence offsets the urgency of restructuring efforts. Devaluing the ruble can have 
a similarly negative effect by virtue of limiting access to foreign technologies and lending. At the 
same time, devaluation increases uncertainty about property rights, for many of the companies 
                                                 
6 This list was approved on December 23, 2008 by the Government Commission for Higher Stability of Economic 
Development in the Russian Federation. On May 12, 2009, an additional nine companies were added to this list (so 
that it now consists of 304 enterprises). The complete list can be found at   
http://www.government.ru/content/4be99bcb0e2341c4b6d8774f9a18a4c4.doc    16
that relied on foreign lending for modernization will have serious problems paying off their 
debts. 
A possible alternative to supporting the largest companies would be to create demand by 
launching public investment projects and programs (primarily directed at the development of 
infrastructure), which should be open to all economic agents that meet public quality-price ratio 
criteria vis-à-vis their goods and services. This approach will more likely provide public support 
for efficient firms that are able to enter new markets, ensure an increased supply of their goods 
and services in the crisis situation, and create new jobs. 
Ultimately, the policy option will depend on the government’s financial resources. The 
strong decrease in tax collection in the spring of 2009 could thereby become a precondition for a 
more sober and pragmatic fiscal policy on the federal and regional levels. 
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